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TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATER AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
PAST PRACTICES AND CURRENT IMPLICATIONS
Abstract
Despitetheirsignificance,physicalinteractionsbetweensurfaceand
groundwater have largely been ignored in international water law. While surface water
has been given considerable attention as a transboundary natural resource, groundwater
has not received the same recognition. International legal doctrines regarding water, such
as the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, only recognized one aspect of groundwater, excluding
confined aquifers. This study discusses how international freshwater treaties have
addressed groundwater resources in the past, and considers current trends. While the
issue of transboundary groundwater in international treaties is becoming increasingly
relevant as disputes over groundwater resources come to the fore, it is usually only
indirectly mentioned in treaties. Groundwater and surface water should be considered
together as part of the hydrological cycle and reflected as such in the legal realm. The
uncertainty of physical properties is not an excuse for the delay of a concrete framework.
The "precautionary principle" should play a role as a guiding factor. An Interactive
Coordinated Approach (ICA) is recommended as a guideline for future implementation
of transboundary groundwater management. The purpose of this study is to demonstrate
the need to develop comprehensive transboundary groundwater management schemes.
KEY TERMS: Transboundary Aquifer, Groundwater, Uncertainty, Precautionary
Principle, Interactive Coordinated Approach (ICA), International Environmental LawTRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATER AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
PAST PRACTICES AND CURRENT IMPLICATIONS
1. Introduction
Over the past century, maintaining adequate freshwater resources for all humans and
environmental communities has become a focal point in the academic and political arenas
(Albert 2000, Falkenmark 2000, Feitelson 2000, Gleick 2002, and Wouters 2000).
Furthermore, conflicts resulting from water competition and degradation are frequently
discussed in the literature (Homer-Dixon 1994, Lowi 1999, Postel and Wolf 2001, Yoffe
2001). The inadequacy of water is expected to be severe in the future, although "the amount
available to the world today is almost the same as it was when the Mesopotamians traded
blows 4500 years ago, even as global demand has steadily increased" (Postel and Wolf 2001).
The reasons for the water deficit in the world are not only geographical problems, but also
increased population growth, land development, insufficient water management techniques,
and a combination of other non-physical factors.
Concern over the availability ofgroundwater'is well warranted, since groundwater
comprises 31 percent of the total freshwater in the world, compared with 0.3 percent for
rivers and lakes (Shiklomanov 1993). Additionally, "aquifers are in many ways an ideal
source of water", providing ready availability for local users and an optimum storage place
(Postel 1999, p. 33). The value of groundwater cannot be overlooked especially in light of
the increasing demand for water.
Despite the significance of groundwater availability and the necessity of
groundwater management, in terms of laws and institutional approaches, management is still
in its infancy at the international level (Barberis 1991, Hayton 1982, Krishina and Salman
1999, and Utton 1982), although some States have begun to expand regulations. In
In this paper, the term 'groundwater' includes water in aquifers. Aquifer is defined as, "a subsurface
waterbearing geologic formation from which significant quantities of water may be extracted"
(Hayton and Utton, 1989, p. 678).comparison,transboundary2surface water has been studied in order to pursue equity and
sustainable development, and management has thoroughly evolved over the last few
decades.
There are marked differences in the status of the recognition for transboundary
surface water and groundwater. Consequently, transboundary groundwater directives have
been omitted from overall water management regulations. The two primary reasons for this
absence are also points of contention in transboundary groundwater management. First,
groundwater characteristics vary in each aquifer. Groundwater is often deep or unevenly
distributed geographically. These uncertainties make groundwater seemingly impossible to
regulate, as well as ill defined. The other reason is the transboundary element. Dealing with
transboundary issues has been intensively studied in surface water; as a result, the
difficulties as well as the necessity for management structures are understood. By contrast,
in terms of transboundary groundwater, even the delineations of an aquifer are a challenge.
Under the best use of monitoring and modeling techniques to identify groundwater
characteristics, the definition of an aquifer cannot provide concrete conclusions about
groundwater ownership. Because of these difficulties, in addition to the rapidly increasing
population and the rising demand for water, groundwater quality and quantity have become
serious environmental, economic, political, and socioeconomic concerns. Therefore, the
establishment of an apparent management framework is critical.
Based on the uncertainties of physical characteristics and transboundary elements of
transboundary groundwater, I will explore three components of transboundary groundwater
management: 1) international groundwater management in environmental law, 2) past trends
in groundwater management, and 3) an institutional framework for transboundary
groundwater.
2'Transboundary' in this context refers to more than one State sharing natural resources. In this paper,
the resource is the aquifer.2. The Notion of Transboundary Groundwater
In order to understand transboundary groundwater management, it is important to
closely look at how the terms groundwater, aquifer, andtransboundary3are defined in the
literature. There are many ways to describe the aquifer. Freeze and Cherry (1979, P. 47)
describe the ambiguity of the definition of the aquifer from the hydrological science
perspective: "of all the words in the hydrologic vocabulary, there are probably none with
more shades of meaning than the term aquifer." Mazor (1995, p. 183) states "[A]quifer, the
basic term of hydrology, has a countless number of definitions and applications, and as a
result the term is esoteric." The physical characteristics of the aquifer are indistinctly
defined; for example, "An aquifer is best defined as a saturated permeable geologic unit that
can transmit significant quantities of water under ordinary hydrologic gradients" (Freeze and
Cherry 1979, p. 47). Fetter (1994) defines an aquifer as, "a geologic unit that can store and
transmit water at rates fast enough to supply reasonable amounts to well"(Fetter 1994,
p.11 0). None of the above definitions completely cover all of the unique characteristics of
aquifers; however, one universal definition for the term aquifer is not important. Instead, it is
more important to identify aquifers' properties by measurements, where possible, because
their geologic formations differ from place to place. Uncertainty over the physical properties
of aquifers is a primary problem for management.
Furthermore, the difficulty of groundwater management often relates to
transboundary issues between States. There are many scholars debating the best
management of transboundary resources, such as the atmosphere, oceans, surface water, and
even outer space. The complexity of the boundary issue is described by Feitelson:
"Boundaries complicate the management of resources, as they create discrepancies between
spheres of control and natural systems" (Feitelson 2000, p. 534). Compared with surface
water, the delineation of the boundaries of groundwater is a challenging issue because of
spatial considerations. Groundwater disperses beneath the surface, irrespective of State
See definition: footnote 2 in this paper.4
boundaries. Although management of groundwater may include a number of ground-boring
and monitoring activities, as well as modeling to delineate the boundaries of the water body,
nevertheless, in many areas the picture may still be incomplete.
Additionally, groundwater is influenced by land-development patterns. These
influences can cause decreasing water levels and contamination of groundwater. It is
important to protect the recharge area, which primarily captures precipitation on the surface,
in order not to disturb water flow into the ground. Unfortunately, the question of how much
land needs to be protected for the recharge area is currently unanswerable because scientists
do not fully understand how groundwater behaves.
Without considering the properties of the land, groundwater management could not
be complete. To account for these unique characteristics, transboundary groundwater
management should utilize the three-dimensional approach, rather than the two-dimensional
approach used for surface water. In the two-dimensional approach, scientists study the
behavior of surface water on a single plane. With groundwater, water percolates into the soil,
drawn by gravity. It moves along more than one plane. The three-dimensional approach
takes into account this complexity of behavior.
It is hard to determine sovereignty for an aquifer with respect to the scale of both
surface development and belowground structure. However, five different cases can be used
to determine sovereignty (Barberis 1991, p. 168):
1) A State-owned aquifer, which is the entire aquifer in a State
2) A confined aquifer divided by an international boundary
3) An aquifer thatisentirely in the territory of a State linked
hydrologically with an international river
4) An aquifer that is entirely in the territory of one State but is
hydrologically linked with another aquifer in a neighboring State
5) An aquifer that is entirely in the territory of one State but whose area
of recharge is in a foreign State.5
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Figure]. Schematic drawing of aqu4fer typesThese best describe guidelines for classifying transboundary groundwater. Except for Case 1,
these conditions address possible sharing of an aquifer between States. One modification of
Case 2 should be noted: if there is a hydrological relationship where intra-State rivers/lakes
are linked to an international aquifer, then it is important to be aware of this relationship
because the intra-State rivers or lakes may have some influence on the aquifer. Schematic
views of these aquifer types are shown in Figure 1.
These guidelines suggest possible conditions that determine the transboundary
nature of aquifers, and provide a means by which States can proactively manage
transboundary aquifers. In addition, these categories are important not only in defining the
nature of the aquifer itself, but also in illustrating the scope of the hydrological relationships
between aquifer-sharing States. Management with a transboundary element is extremely
difficult because of the challenges of cooperation among neighboring countries. This can be
an additional obstacle for transboundary aquifer management.
3. Evolution of International Groundwater Management in Environmental Law
The principles for transboundary groundwater management have not yet been visibly
developed. The reasons for the absence of transboundary groundwater law are, as Krishina
and Salman (1999, p.163) point out, "the inadequacy of scientific data" and "complexity of
the issues of groundwater." In order to allow for uncertainty concerning the physical
characteristics of groundwater, principles or laws on transboundary groundwaters are left
undefined or ambiguous. These ambiguities will be discussed in real contexts: the Helsinki
Rules, Seoul Rules, Bellagio Draft Treaty, Agenda 21, The Law of the Non-Navigational
Use of International Watercourses, and the Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes. In particular, the discussions will be
focused on the transboundary elements and physical characteristics of groundwater.3.1 Helsinki Rules
The International Law Association (ILA), established in 1873, is a
non-governmental international organization that works for the development of emerging
rules of international law (Krishna and Salman, 1999, p. 170). The earliest works regarding
transboundary groundwater regulations are the Helsinki Rules.
The Helsinki Rules, drafted by ILA in 1966, represent an early attempt at codifying
customary international law pertaining to transboundary water resources (Eckstein 1998, p.
92). The final version is called, "Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International
Rivers", and was published in 1967. The concept of a 'drainage basin' in the Helsinki Rules
was used for defining the influential geographical area of water system (Article II). As a part
of an international drainage basin, underground waters were included as follows:
"An international drainage basin is a geographical area extending over two or more
States determined by the watershed limits of the system of waters, including surface
and underground waters, flowing into a common terminus" (Helsinki Rules: Article II,
1967).
In the commentary section, the underground waters "... constituting a part of the
drainage basin are those that contribute to its principal river, a stream or lake or other
common terminus"(Helsinki Rules, Chapter 1, Article II, 1967). The Helsinki Rules clearly
state that groundwater is, "connected to surface water" (Krishna and Salman, 1999, p. 170).
Hayton explains that Article II "encompasses all waters included in the entire system"
(Hayton 1982, p. 75). Although Article II declared a connection between surface and
groundwater, as Krishna and Salman point out, "confined groundwater, that is groundwater
which is not connected to surface water, is not dealt with under the Helsinki Rules" (Krishna
and Salman, 1999, p. 170). Even though the importance of groundwater was recognized, the
Helsinki Rules excluded confined aquiferswhich constitute a large portion of
groundwaterbecause a confined aquifer might exist between States, but not be connected
to a particular body of surface water (a principal river, stream, lake, or other commonterminus). The International Law Association addressed this exclusion in the later Seoul
Rules.
3.2 Seoul Rules
Twenty years later, the Seoul Rules (1987) were proposed at the Sixty-Second
Conference of ILA, which was held in Seoul, Korea. The conference focused on
complementing the Helsinki Rules. The Seoul Rules defined groundwater and aquifer by
using the terms interchangeably. Also, some specific terms were defined, such as
groundwater catchments area and fossil water.
In Article 1: The Waters of International Aquifers, an aquifer is described as
"All underground water bearing strata capable of yielding water on a practicable,
basis, whether these are in other instruments or contexts called by another name
such as "groundwater reservoir," "groundwater catchment area," etc. including the
waters in fissured or fractured rock formations and the structures containing deep,
so called fossil waters" (Seoul Rules, 1986: Article 1).
Article II defined what constitutes an international aquifer, as well as the hydrologic
interdependence of surface and ground water:
"An aquifer that contributes waters to, or receives water from, surface
waters of an international basin constitutes part of an international basin
for the purpose of the Helsinki Rules. An aquifer intersected by the
boundary between two or more States that does not contribute water to, or
receive water from, surface waters of an international drainage basin
constitutes an international drainage basin for the purposes of the Helsinki
Rules" (Seoul Rules, 1986: Article 2).
Compared to the Helsinki Rules, the Seoul Rules clearly shows that even aquifers not
connected with the surface waters of an international drainage basin, such as a confined
aquifer between States, are also considered as in an international drainage basin. The
implementation of the Helsinki Rules and the Seoul Rules is the fundamental recognition of
the hydrologic relationship between surface and groundwater, and suggests that groundwater
management requires an understanding of the mechanisms of the hydrologic cycle.3.2 Bellagio Draft Treaty
The Bellagio DraftTreaty,4proposed by Robert I-layton and Albert Utton in 1989,
was a revision of the "IxtapaDraft,"5proposed in 1985 by Ann Berkley Rodgers and Albert
Utton. The Ixtapa Draft focused on management of the U.S.-Mexico border region aquifers,
while the Bellagio Draft Treaty worked to apply aquifer managements more globally. The
idea of drafting the treaty was described in its introduction of the draft treaty:
"The overriding goal of the draft treaty is to achieve joint, optimum
utilization of the available waters, facilitated by procedures for avoidances
or resolution of differences over shared groundwaters in the face of the
ever increasing pressures on this priceless resources" (Hayton and Utton
1989, p. 665).
While the Bellagio Draft Treaty suggests a framework for comprehensive groundwater
management, it has yet to be implemented for practical use in groundwater resources
management. The treaty is divided into 20 sections, and each article is followed by a
comment section. The treaty also articulates management methods in Article II: General
Purpose6.
Article I includes the definitions of terms, such as aquifer, border region,
contaminant, contamination, depletion, drought, groundwater, impairment, interrelated
surface water, pollution, recharge, transboundary aquifer, transboundary groundwater
Hayton and Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio Draft Treaty, 1989.
The draft treaty also described the evolution of transboundary groundwater law in the introduction
section.
Rogers and Utton, The Ixtapa Draft Agreement Relating to the Use of Transboundary
Groundwaters, 1985.
6Article II -1 "The parties recognize their common interest and responsibility in ensuring the
reasonable and equitable development and management of groundwaters in border region for the
well being of their peoples. 2Accordingly, the Parties have entered into this Agreement in order to
attain the optimum utilization and conservation of transboundary groundwaters and to protect the
underground environment. It is also the purpose of the Parties to develop and maintain reliable data
and information concerning transboundary aquifers and their waters in order to use and protect these
waters in a rational and informed manner."10
conservation area, and transboundary groundwater. Defining these terms prevents the type
of confusion caused by lack of accepted definitions. Aquifer is defined as, "a subsurface
waterbearing geologic formation from which significant quantities of water may be
extracted" and groundwater is "the water in aquifers" (Hayton and Utton, 1989,p. 678).
Note that aquifer is actually defined as a geologic formation, rather than a water storage area
under the ground. This definition of aquifer emphasizes its hydrological relation to surface
waters. Similarly, the definition of interrelated surface waters emphasizes hydrologic
interdependencies between surface and ground waters. The definition of transboundary
groundwaters is similar to that adopted in Seoul in 1 986. The definition of the term,
conjunctive use, as "the integrated development and management of surface and
groundwater, as a total water supply system" (Hayton and Utton, 1989,p. 678) shows the
firm relationship between surface and groundwater, and suggests the need for efficient
management. Surface water was recognized as an influence on the quantity and quality of
outflows and inflows of transboundary groundwater.
The significant points of the Bellagio Treaty are the clarification of the definition of
aquifer and the recognition of the connection between groundwater and surface water, which
is shown in the idea of creating transboundary groundwater conservation areas. Additionally,
the management of aquifers should therefore be conducted with an awareness of the
interconnected relationships between surface- and groundwaters.
3.3 Agenda 21
Agenda 218 was adopted in June 1992 by the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED). It is a comprehensive action plan for
Seoul Rule in Article I; The waters of International Aquifers states, "The waters of an aquifer that
is intersected by the boundary between two or more States are international groundwaters if such an
aquifer with its waters forms an international basin or part thereof ".
8Rio de Janeiro, June 16, 1992UN Doe. A/Conf.151/26, Vol. III (1992)11
environmental management. Chapter 1 8 under Section II: "Conservation and Management
of Resources for Development", which deals with water, including groundwater issues.
Groundwater is recognized in Agenda 21 as a freshwater source and is given parallel status
with surface water. Both surface water and groundwater resources have to be managed
interrelatedly, taking into consideration both water quantity and quality (Chapter 18.3).
Additionally, this action plan recommends holistic freshwater management (Chapter 18.35).
The plan indirectly infers that freshwater resource management should be considered along
with the hydrologic cycle. Interestingly, this action plan also points out that the degradation
of water quality has been underestimated because of the inaccessibility and physical
uncertainties of aquifer systems (Chapter 18.37). It advocates that groundwater protection is
a substantial element of water resource management.
Agenda 21 does not include specific provisions of groundwater management,
except as a statement of bilateral or multilateral cooperation with the UN system and other
world organizations, and the development of technical/institutional capacities. In particular,
Agenda 21 neglects the transboundary aspects of freshwater resource management.
McCaffrey points out that "it fails to include acomprehensivetreatment of the international,
or transboundary aspects of the protection and management of fresh water" (McCaffrey
1994, p. 158). Section 18.9 explains that integrated water resources management can apply
on a "catchment basin or sub-basin" basis, and includes integration of "the land and water
related aspects." The holistic concept reflects this statement; however, Section 18.10 limits
this integrated approach:
"In the case of transboundary water resources, there is a need for riparian states to
formulate water resources strategies, prepare water resources action programs and
For the full text of Agenda 21 see http://www.unep.org/Documents/Defau1jip'?DocumentIE=52
Chapter 18: Protection of the quality and supply of freshwater resources: application of integrated
approaches to the development, management, and use of water resources. The basic summary of
chapter 18 was described in McCaffrey. 1994 .The Management of Water resources. In The
Environmental after Rio: International law and economics! edited by Luigi Campiglio et. al.12
consider, where appropriate, the harmonization of these strategies and action program
(18.10)".
The statement is based on the idea that integrated management requires the cooperation of
riparian states for transboundary water resources; however, the limitations created by the
'where appropriate' clause does not significantly affect the management of water resource
integration.
Overall, even though Agenda 21 does not completely address groundwater issues, it
provides positive recommendations that such resources are significant as a part of freshwater
bodies, and also for the future demands of water resources.
3.4 The Law of the Non-Navigational Use of International Watercourses
The International Law Commission (ILC) was established in 1947 as the legal arm of
the UN general Assembly to promote the progressive development of international law and
its codification (International Law Commission: Introduction 2002)10. The ILC has worked
to develop the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses since 1970.
The commission proposed the Draft Articles on the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses in199411, and the United Nations GeneralAssembly finally adopted the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Use of International
Watercourses in May of1997.12 Over all, both positive and negativearguments about water
management are present in the convention (Beaumont 2000, Dellapenna 2001, McCaffrey
2001, Wolf 1 999a). This section focuses on the discussion of groundwater issues.
The draft on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses
(1994) consists of articles and commentaries. The commentaries provide the details in each
See International Law Commission http://www.un.org/law/ilc/introfra.htm
For History, See full text at http://www.un.org/lawliic/texts/nnavfra.htm (UN Document
A/CN .4/L492 (1994)
12UN Document A/RES/51/229 of 8 July 199713
article. The Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
watercourses in 1997 used the same definition of watercourses as was used in the draft.
In particular, Article II: Use of Terms includes the terms; 'international
watercourse', 'watercourse' and 'watercourse State'. A watercourse was defined as, "a
system of surface waters and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical
relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus" (Article II: IJN
1994). The ILC rejected the 'drainage basin' approach of the Helsinki Rules. Rather, the ILC
defined a watercourse as including only groundwater that flows into a 'common terminus',
and "as being overly broad and replaced [drainage basin] with the term the 'watercourse"
(Lazerwitz, 1993). Even though the connection between surface waters and groundwaters,
as well as the term 'groundwater' itself are clearly defined, the 'water courses' approach did
not include 'confined aquifers' in the Convention. Water that does not flow into a common
terminus is, by definition, excluded from the watercourse. The law failed to consider the
mechanisms of the hydrologic cycle, in particular, the behavior of groundwater.
The ILC realized that there was a gap in the draft. As a result, in the same year that
the draft was launched, the International Law Commission added the Resolution on
Confined TransboundaryGroundwater'3as having "completed its consideration of... The
Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses" (ILC 1994). The ILC
recognized the following:
"Confined groundwater, that is groundwater not related to an international watercourses,
is also a natural resource of vital importance of sustaining life, health and the integrity
of ecosystems" (ILC 1994).
This resolution demonstrates the necessity of continuing the effort to elaborate the rules for
transboundary groundwater resources. The ILC also considered in the resolution that the
rules regarding water management that were presented in the draft of the Law of
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses articles may be applicable to
transboundary confined groundwater.
'For the text of the Resolution see 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1994 at14
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses articles may be applicable to
transboundary confined groundwater.
3.5 Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes
A recent example that includes groundwater in the scope is the Protocol on Water and
Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses
and International Lakes. This protocol was adopted on June 17, 1999, in London. The
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International
Lakes was adoptedml992. It did not address groundwater specifically. For example, the
definition in the convention (Article 1) did not include groundwater, however, this Protocol
includes the definition in the Article 2.
The objective of this protocol is to protect human health and well being (Article 1),'
and it recognizes that water plays an essential role in doing so. The definitions of
'groundwater' and 'transboundary waters' use language similar to that of definitions in other
agreements because this protocol emphasizes the relationship between water and human
health.
In terms of groundwater, the scope includes groundwater as well as surface
freshwater, estuaries, coastal waters, and other water bodies (Article 3). The article
recommends extending the consideration of water resources management to the
transboundary, as well as State levels in order to protect human health and well being. It also
recommends the spatial coverage of water management, including the protection of water
ecosystems.
'Article 1: Objective "The objective of this protocol is to promote at all appropriate levels, nationally as well
as in transboundary and international contexts, the protection of human health and well-being, both individual
and collective, within a framework of sustainable development, through improving water management,
including the protection of water ecosystems, and through preventing, controlling and reducing water-related
disease" (Economic and Social Council. MP.WAT/2000/l/EUR/ICP/EHCO 020205/8Fin, 18 October 199915
In conjunction with this scope, Article 6: Targets and Target Dates, 5-(b)
specifically mentions the management level of water resources: "transboundary, national
and/or local contexts, preferably on the basis of catchment areas or groundwater aquifers"
(Article 6). It implies that transboundary aquifers should be managed on an individual
aquifer basis, although aquifer is not defined in the context. However, this statement is a
significant recognition for transboundary groundwater management, since the
transboundary element has been an obstacle to the management structure in groundwater.
This protocol suggests that to achieve the protection of human health and well
being requires an integrated approach to the management of water resources, including
groundwater.
3.6 Summary
The increasing importance of groundwater management has led to the evolutionary
development of rules and resolutions over the last 36 years, from the Helsinki Rules to the
Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, adopted in 1999 (Table 1). The
limited drainage basin approach has shifted to the international watercourse approach.
Furthermore, recommendations for water resource management now are directed at both
transboundary and State levels in order to protect human health and well being, and the
environment.Table 1. Summary of international law related to groundwater
Helsinki Rules (1966)
Defines a body of underground water as part of an international drainage basin, except
confined groundwater
Seoul Rules (1986)
Defines international drainage basin, "An aquifer intersected by the boundary between two
or more States that does not contribute water to, or receive water from, surface waters of an
international drainage basin constitutes an international drainage basin for the purposes of the
Helsinki Rules"
Bellagio Draft Treaty (1989)
Hydrologic interdependence between surface water and groundwater
Transboundary aquifer is a part of an international basin
Agenda 21(1992) Chapter 18
Suggests the comprehensive action plan for environmental management
Recognizes groundwater as freshwater bodies, and gives parallel status to surface water
Recommends holistic freshwater management
Neglects transboundary aspect of freshwater resource management
The Draft of the Law of the Non-Navigational Use of International Watercourses (1994)
Uses International Watercourse approach
Does not include confined aquifer
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses
Uses same definition of watercourses as in the draft (1994)
The Resolution of the Law of the Non-Navigational Use of International Watercourses (1994)
Recognizes that confined aquifer, that is, groundwater not related to an international
watercourse, is also substantial
The Rules regarding water management that are presented in the draft of the Law may be
applicable to transboundary confined aquifer
The Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (1999)
Recommends extending the levels of water resource management to transboundary, State's
level in order to protect human health and well-being
Recommends integrated water resources management, including groundwater17
The implications of past rules and laws are essential for clarifying the issues
surrounding transboundary groundwater resources, as well as the need to face future water
scarcity. Although the significance of groundwater in terms of future demands on water
resources has been recognized, scientists, lawmakers, and decision makers are still
struggling with management questions. Difficulties arise because of uncertainty surrounding
groundwater systems and the transboundary element makes it difficult to use definitive
terms in environmental laws. Rules and laws have also recognized that groundwater is vital
not only for humans, but also for environmental health. Hence, the implementation of
transboundary groundwater resource management should include a wide range of spatial and
long-term considerations.
The next section explores how groundwater resources were addressed in
international freshwater treaties of the past.
4. Past Trends in Groundwater Management
4.1 Methodology
In order to examine past trends in groundwater management, approximately 400
treaties from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) at the Department of
Geosciences at Oregon State University (Wolf 1999b,c), UN Treaty Collection and other
sources of literature (FAO 1986, Teclaff 1981,1985, Utton 1981, 1982) were reviewed. The
treaty review combined TFDD with other treaties that specifically mentioned ground water
issues in their text. When searching the treaty documents related to groundwater issues,
other keywords such as aquifer, groundwater, spring, subsoil, subsurface underground and
wells were used. However, references to riverbed, riverbank, or activities at both bed and
bank that might indirectly influence the groundwater regime were not considered treaties
related to groundwater provisions for this analysis.
For the analysis, treaties were categorized into three levels according to the degree
of groundwater resource management (Table 2). Level 1 status was given if the treaty
indirectly mentioned groundwater according to the keywords, but did not deal directly with18
Table 2. Description of the degree of groundwater resource management.
Level Description
Level 1Indirectly mentioned groundwater; no specific provisions of management
Level 2Briefly mentioned groundwater provisions of management; water rights of
groundwater are assigned to a State; clarified the physical relationship of
groundwater with surface water.
Level 3Deals with groundwater regulations specifically, including allocation, quality
provisions, and/or protection of land
groundwater, and simply mentioned it in the text. Level 2 status was given if the treaty
briefly mentioned groundwater, but there were no specific provisions, implementations, or
clarifications of the physical relationships between surface water and groundwater.
Although rights for ground, spring, and aquifer waters were assigned to a given State, the
specificity of allocation is absent in this level. Level 3 status was given if a treaty specifically
dealt with provisions, water allocation, or implementations of groundwater quality.
Treaties that mentioned groundwater were also classified according to subcategories
within the primary categories mentioned above: 1) water quality, including pollution; 2)
water quantity, which included reference to the allocations of groundwater; 3) territory!
boundary concerns; 4) physical relationship with surface water; 5) water right; 6) water
quality and quantity; and 7) others.
A series of preliminary analyses were conducted that
> Consider the spatial and temporal distribution of treaties
> Identify the issues of concern
Discuss the degree of specificity in how groundwater was addressed and
whether physical surface-groundwater relationships were detailed.19
4.2. Findings and Discussions
In total, there are approximately 400 treaties related to transboundary freshwater, of
which 109 treaties mention groundwater. Only 62 treaties were actually reviewed. The
review was limited by a lack of access to the actual texts or to English translations.
In terms of spatial distribution, the majority of groundwater treaties are from
Europe, 35 treaties, followed by Africa, 13 treaties, Asia, 10 treaties, and then North
America, 4 treaties (Figure 2). None of them are found in the South America region. The
regions that have prominent surface water degradation and historical scarcity, such as the
Danube, Rhine, the Aral Sea, major river basins in Africa and the Middle East, include
some degree of groundwater provisions in the treaties. Seventeen treaties are multilateral,
and 47 are bi-lateral agreements. Thirteen of the 17 multilateral treaties are post 1970s, and
aim for water agreement in the transboundary context. This trend reflects increasing
concerns about global environmental problems.
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Figure 2. Spatial distribution of treaties.20
The oldest of the international water treaties is the Treaty of limits between Portugal
and Spain (1864) (Figure 3). It states that both countries share water from springs, if springs
are located on their boundary. The most recent is the Revised Protocol on Shared
Watercourses in the Southern African Development Community in 2000. The protocol states
that groundwater is considered in a watercourse system. It is a broad statement of principles
specific to a region, but not to a particular water system.
The number of treaties that address groundwater does not increase over time.
However, there are some interesting trends: Previous to and right after World War II, treaties
that mention groundwater deal with it as a frontier or border issue. Additionally, they do not
use the term 'groundwater' directly; instead, they use 'spring' and 'well'. For example, in a
treaty between Germany and Poland for the settlement of frontier questions (1/27/1926), a
spring is a landmark between the countries. The treaty states that "Polish nationals having a
right of used should be allowed to cross the territory near the spring south of Proschau which
has been assigned to Germany."
The term 'spring' is first used in 1864 in the treaty of limits between Portugal and
Spain, which is also mentioned as the oldest treaty. The term 'well' was used in 1888, is in the
Agreement between the Government of Great Britain and France, with in regard to the
Somali Coast. The term 'well' was used for the landmark for territory demarcation and
sharing water. The terms 'aquifer' and 'groundwater' were used after 1950, except in one
agreement: Convention regarding the Water Supply of Aden between Great Britain and The
Sultan of Abdali (4/11/1910). This trend shows the evolution of the increasing recognition of
the importance of groundwater, from a landmark to a resource, as provisions regarding
groundwater are specified in international treaties concerning water resource management.21
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Figure 3. International freshwater agreements by decade.
In the category analysis (Figure 4), 6215 out of 109 treaties have been categorizedSO
far. Of 62 treaties, only 6 treaties were found to deal with groundwater quality. For example,
the protocol amending the 1978 agreement between the United States of America and
Canada on Great Lakes water quality in 1987 states that in order to maintain or improve the
quality of Great Lakes water, concern should be directed toward the control of groundwater
contaminants. This agreement clearly recognizes the physical relationship between surface
water and groundwater. Furthermore, only 8 treaties mention quantities. Despite concerns
over groundwater quality and quantity, the total number of treaties that mention both quality
and quantity is only 14 treaties. In contrast, 17 treaties are mentioned as a border and frontier
issue and the physical relationships between surface and groundwater is mentioned in 17
treaties.
Full text is not available for all treaties. Category analysis conducted only on those treaties where
the full text is available.I
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Figure 4. Categories by issue.
Seventeen treaties in this category of physical relationship between ground and
surface water indicate that groundwater protection is included as a secondary reason for the
protection of surface water. However, although the agreements may emphasize the
relationships between surface and ground waters, they avoid specific terms that offer direct
protections for groundwater.
Out of the 62 treaties reviewed, nine treaties are categorized as Level 3 (Appendix 1
(a)), which has specific groundwater management provisions or allocation issues. These
nine treaties can be further divided into groups depending on (1) extraction limits from
springs or aquifers; (2) water allocations; and (3) the inclusion of management principles.
Limitations on extractions from springs or aquifers are mentioned in five agreements.
For example, the Mexico-U.S. Agreement on the Permanent and Defmitive Solution to the23
Salinity of the Colorado River Basin (Minute 242) gives limitations on groundwater
pumping within the region. The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context, Espoo (9/10/1997) states that, generally, the extraction of a certain
amount of water affects the surrounding environment. The Israeli-Palestinian interim
agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (1995) Article 40, which concerns water and
sewage issues, makes broad water management statements. This agreement requires the
allocation of groundwater from an aquifer to be shared between the two countries. It
includes the specific pump rates from the Eastern, Northeastern, and Western Aquifers, the
establishment of a joint water committee, and regulation of committee's roles. The
agreement relating to the protection, utilization, and recharging of the Franco-Swiss Geneva
Aquifer also specifies limits to the amount of water that may be withdrawn from the aquifer.
The treaty between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (1994) in
Article IV: Groundwater in Emek Ha' arava / Wadi Arava, states that the extraction rate from
wells can be up to 10 MCM/year, and that this decision will be made by the Joint Water
Committee. An interesting observation concerning this treaty is that the treaty primarily
aims for peace between States. Water issues may potentially provoke conflict among peoples
in the region; consequently, the utilization and rights of groundwater are clearly defined in
order to avert conflicts.
One treaty specifically mentions water allocationthe treaty concerning State
frontiers and neighborly relations between Iran and Iraq and the protocol (6/13/1975) notes
that that the sharing of waters from springs is to be conducted on an hourly basis between
two States.
Four agreements mention management principles. The Convention on Cooperation
for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the River Danube (6/29/1994) stipulates
"groundwater resources subject to a long-term protection as well as protection zones
valuable for existing or future drinking water supply purposes" (Article 6). This treaty
explicitly mentions the designated use of groundwater. Furthermore, in order to protect the
resource, the treaty not only requires long-term management of groundwater, but also24
provides for the protection of the land surface, which plays a role in the filtration of water
from the atmosphere. This treaty shows that groundwater regulations should consider the
hydrologic cycle, both temporally and spatially. The 1910 convention regarding the water
supply of Aden (Yemen) between Great Britain and the Sultan of Abdali states that water
supply construction by the British should not affect the quantity or quality of water from
wells across the border in the territory of the Sultan of Abdali. This agreement is an example
of a situation where one State agrees not to cause harm to another. The idea of not causing
harm can be seen in one of the principles of international environmental law. Additionally,
the Johnston negotiations (12/31/1955), although unratified as a treaty, does attempt to
function as an agreement between politics and water resource management among the States
of Syria, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon. A provision of the agreement includes the diversion of
waters from saline springs in order to prevent increasing the salinity of Lake Tiberias.
However, this provision focuses on the surface water, rather than the groundwater. The
Convention on the Geneva Aquifer (1977) is the most elaborate, in terms of particularities of
groundwater management. The scope of this agreement begins to explore the joint
management scheme for the Geneva Aquifer.
Thirty-three agreements in Level 2 (Appendix 1 (b)) briefly mention groundwater
indirectly, as some extension of surface water (which represents 17 treaties of this level).
Seven treaties of agreements in this level are related to territory/boundary issues.
Interestingly, the agreements often concern pollution, with reference to the water quality of
surface water. In order to protect the surface water, groundwater has to be protected, but
groundwater is not the primary issue in these agreements. For example, the convention
creating the Niger Basin Authority and Protocol (1980) states the need for "the initiating and
monitoring of an orderly and rational regional policy for the utilization of the surface and
underground waters in the Basin" (Article 4). This agreement notes that surface and
underground waters should be rational and cooperatively managed. However, this statement
is limited in that it is concerned only with the groundwater in the Niger Basin, since the
agreement defines only certain tributaries.25
There are 19 treaties in Category 1 (Appendix 1 (c)) that include at least one key
word concerning groundwater, such as aqu[er, groundwater, spring, subsoil, subsurface,
underground, or wells. In this category, the frontier demarcation-related issues are prominent.
They comprise 9 treaties of this level: for example, "Borderline also applies in the subsoil"
(Agreement between Poland and the German Democratic Republic 7/6/1950). This
statement expresses the State's sovereignty over the subsoil; however, it does not
specifically mention resources such as groundwater. Sovereignty could apply to mineral
rights as well as to hydrological aspects. The statement also applies to the physical
relationship between groundwater and surface water, and indirectly implies that
groundwater should be protected.
The agreement between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Republic of Niger
(7/17/1986)16 defines groundwater undersome limitedconditions'7:
"Groundwater resources shall not be accounted for the purpose of equitable sharing
determination unless: (a) such resources are part of shared river basins within the
meaning of Article 1, paragraph (3)18; or (b) such resources lie in whole or only in part
within the shared river basins and are bi-sected by the common frontier between the
Contracting Parties" (Article9)18
From the perspective of quantity concern, only groundwater that contributes to river basins
is discussed in this treaty.
16 between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Republic of Niger Concerning the
Equitable Sharing in the Development, Conservation and Use of Their Common Water Resources.
17Article 1, 2."The shared river basins to which this Agreement applies are: a. the MaggialLamido
River Basin; b the GadalGoulbi of Maradi River Basin; c.the Tagwai/El Fadama River Basin; and
d.the lower section of the Komadougou-Yobe River Basin, and each River Basin shall be defined by
reference to the Maps annexed to, and forming an integral part of, this Agreement."
'8Article 1 Paragraph (3) "Subject to the provisions of Article 9, a reference to the shared river basins
shall include a reference to underground waters contributing to the flow of surface waters."Overall, this study quantitatively shows that the treaties of the past do deal with
groundwater. However, groundwater is usually treated as a secondary issue of surface water.
Thirty-four of agreements are in the categories of territory/boundary issues or physical
relationships between surface and groundwater. Nine agreements out of 62 have specific
provisions for groundwater management.
If the best way to manage the groundwater resource is on an aquifer-by-aquifer basis,
specific agreements for groundwater should become more widespread. However, at present,
the provisions for groundwater have been left behind in the management of surface water,
for example, treaties address groundwater in only one sentence or one word, such as
groundwater; spring, or well, or use ambiguous words in the text. Additionally, the locations
of transboundary groundwaters have not been concretely identified, in contrast to
transboundary surface waters. The first step of transboundary groundwater management
might be to identify the location and properties of aquifers.
Recent treaties reflect the concept of basin-wide surface water resource management.
Use of the basin-wide approach and the expansion of its scope to include groundwater have
been gradually increasing. This trend has resulted from increasing environmental problems
and, in particular, concerns over aquatic ecosystems and human health. These analyses
demonstrate a growing awareness of the need to manage groundwater resources conjointly
with surface water resources, since the hydrological relationship between groundwater and
surface water cannot be separated. However, in order to develop concrete structure for the
management of individual aquifers, institutional guidelines must first be elaborated. If, in so
doing, the hydrologic cycle is ignored, transboundary groundwater management will not
succeed in bringing about the sustainable development of groundwater.
5. Practice of International Groundwater Management
5.1. Dealing with Uncertainty of Transboundary Groundwater Resources
The uncertainty in science is not irreconcilable with the realities of politics. Making
a compact of international environmental law usually takes a long time, and the delay in
action may result in serious environmental degradations in the meantime. According to27
Lawrence Susskind, "There will always be uncertainty hovering over global environmental
treaty negotiations" (Susskind 1994). Without highly credible data, involved States may well
be reluctant to sign an agreement because they have to take the risk of uncertainty; they may
also put themselves at a disadvantage by doing so.
Without exception, there are enormous physical uncertainty involved in the study
and management of groundwater: for instance, determining the flow of aquifers, quantities
of water available, surface land area and time necessary for recharge, as well as the location
of aquifers, including the boundary conditions. Additionally, there are administrative and
political considerations as well, as the transboundary element of groundwater often creates
ambiguities over States' sovereignty and responsibilities.
Transboundary groundwater resources in treaties referred to in the previous section
show that there are not many treaties that address the specific details of groundwater
properties. Uncertainty surrounding the physical properties of groundwater in fact represents
the main hindrance to the establishment of rules concerning this resource. The absence of
specific regulations currently results in fewer obligations for groundwater management;
consequently, decision makers are likely to ignore the management of transboundary
groundwater until it becomes a problem.
The next section will demonstrate a relevant framework for the negotiation process,
as well as suggest a practical approach for addressing transboundary issues. However, this
section of the paper will first discuss how uncertainty in science is handled in the
international environmental negotiation arena, using the process of negotiation and
elaborated practical framework of the Kyoto Protocol as an example. The Kyoto Protocol
addresses the reduction of greenhouse emissions, which requires transboundary cooperation
and regulations; therefore, the Kyoto Protocol provides a model for dealing with uncertainty
regarding transboundary elements that can apply to groundwater management. Second, a
relevant "precautionary principle" for addressing uncertainty of transboundary groundwater
management will be discussed.28
5.1.1 Uncertainty in Environmental Problems
Many issues dealing with high levels of uncertainty have been discussed in the
international environmental policy arena. For instance, the agreement about ozone-layer
depletion in the Montreal Protocol resulted from mitigating uncertainty in the negotiation
processes. The most well-known example is the Kyoto Protocol, which was enacted in 1997.
It was an effort to reduce greenhouse gases emissions with multi-country cooperation (186
countries signed up for ratification by December 2001). An inevitable, significant number of
uncertainty were dealt with: how much greenhouse gas emissions impact climate change, the
sources and sink of greenhouses gases, and so on. The main issue in the negotiations was
identifying target CO2 reduction levels; the resulting document included quantitative targets,
called "Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction Objectives (QELROs)" (Oberthur
and Ott 1999, p. 115).
To address the uncertainty of CO2 emissions, the Kyoto Protocol utilizes so-called
"flexible mechanisms" and a "process-oriented" approach for procedures and institutions
(OberthUr and Ott 1999:37). The flexible mechanisms and process-oriented approach allow
negotiation to move forward with many countries' interests and incentives represented. The
flexible mechanisms of the framework are as follows (OberthUr and Ott 1999,p. 117):
> Multi-year targets
> Banking (transfer of unused emissions into the next budget period) and
borrowing (transfer from the next budget period) over several budget
periods
> A comprehensive approach for six gases
> Emissions trading
> Joint implementation.
One example of a flexible mechanism is that the original proposal included target
CO2 reductions of 20% by the year 2005. In the final agreement, however, target reductions29
were differentiated for Parties in the commitment period. Furthermore, reduction targets for
six gases (CO2, CH4, N20, SF6, and two fluorinated gasses) were based on the "basket
approach." The basket approach involves an overall reduction strategy for the six gases
together, rather than targeted restrictions for each gas individually.
The "process-oriented approach" (Oberthür and Ott 1999,p. 37) is a basic guideline
of the flexible mechanism that addresses the uncertainty of science, rather than a separate
idea. In 1992, the Framework Convention on Climate Change(FCCC)'9was" a milestone
because it established the institutional framework and some, although rudimentary,
procedures that can be used by Parties to further elaborate provisions of the Convention"
(37). Article 4.2 (d) of FCCC states, "... in the light of the best available scientific
information and assessment on climate change and its impacts, as well as relevant technical,
social and economic information" (Article 4.2 (d) FCCC). This article suggests that the
process-oriented approach uses thebest availablescientific information and assessment,
which allows decision makers some leeway to take action, rather than postponing decisions
on the climate change problem.
In particular, the process-oriented approach affects the process of the most
controversial issue: CO2 sinks.20 Some of the questions surrounding CO2 sinks include how
to measure CO2 sinks for determining target reductions and how changing land use alters
CO2 sinks. Article 34
21specifically addresses these uncertainties. The article states that the
19United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992). Legal basis of Kyoto Process
adopted in 1992. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/corivkp/conveng.pdf
20To maintain theCO2level in system, the carbon cycle in nature have to be in equilibrium. However,
human-induced additional carbon dioxide, such as fossil fuels, changes this cycle. ACO2sink can be
defined as "a system that stores more carbon that it emits" (Oberthür and Ott 1999:131)
21Article 3-4 "Prior to the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the
Parties to this Protocol, each Party included in Annex I shall provide, for consideration by the
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, data to establish its level of carbon stocks
in 1990 and to enable an estimate to be made of its changes in carbon stocks in subsequent years. The
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session
or as soon as practicable thereafter, decide upon modalities, rules and guidelines as to how, and
which, additional human- induced activities related to changes in greenhouse gas emissions by
sources and removals by sinks in the agricultural soils and the land use change and forestry
categories shall be added to, or subtracted from, the assigned amounts for parties included in Annex I,levels of carbon stocks in 1990 are to be used to determine estimates of CO2 change in
subsequent years, rather than carbon sinks. Carbon sinks provide uncertain scientific data
and there is much opposition to their use in baseline calculations. Furthermore, sources
created by additional human activities and sinks created by changing land use and forestry
management would necessitate later adjustments in baseline calculations. Article 3.4 shows
that the procedure for determining the target levels helps to form a consensus for addressing
the reduction of CO2
The Kyoto Protocol succeeded in mitigating uncertainty in science through the
flexible mechanism and process-oriented approach during negotiations. As a result, the
involved parties were to cooperate in order to work toward remission of greenhouse gases.
Susskind states, "Uncertainty, however, provided an incentive to negotiate" (Susskind 1994,
p. 67). He claims that if there is no uncertainty, negotiation is not necessary; in other words,
global environmental agreements always evolve through a sequence of negotiations that
allow each party to acquire their own interests. Consequently, the flexible mechanism and
process-oriented approach in the negotiation process enabled the parties to address the
uncertainty of sciences. The flexible mechanism "assists to meet [parties] commitment"
(The World Bank)22. The negotiation process of the Kyoto Protocol demonstrates that the
existence of uncertainty is no excuse for failure to solve transboundary problems.
The idea of flexible mechanisms as applied to transboundary groundwater
management between Israel and Palestine has been explored by Feitelson and Haddad
(1997). They called it, "Sequential Institution Building Approach" (Feitelson and Haddad
1997). As a cooperative research project, The Palestine Consultancy Group, The Harry S
taking into account uncertainty, transparency in reporting, verifiability, the methodological work of
the Intergovernmental on Climate Change, the advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific
and Technological Advice in accordance with Article 5 and the decisions of the Conference of the
Parties. Such a decision shall apply in the second and subsequent commitment periods. A party may
choose to apply such a decision on these additional human- induced activities for its first
commitment period, provided that these activities have taken place since 1990" (Kyoto Protocol to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change).
22International Environmental Law: Concept and Issues
http:www4.worldbank.orgllegal/Iegen/legen _iel.html31
Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, and scholars from the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem compiled a final report regarding the joint management of shared
aquifers in 1995. They described four basic structures on which the joint management
operation was built: Resource Protection, Crisis Management, Economically Based, and
Comprehensive integrative structures (Feitelson and Haddad 1997) There are twenty-two
activities contained under these four main structures. These activities, such as monitoring of
water resources, are conducted in appropriately different stages. They note that the Joint
Water Committee (JWC) allowed for considerable uncertainty in the process ofjoint
management, particularly when decision makers are unsure of the most desirable action.
This example may not work for aquifers under multiple jurisdictions; however, it does
provide some insights for future transboundary groundwater management.
In summary, the flexible mechanism and process-oriented approach are useful for
mitigating uncertainty surrounding transboundary groundwater management because (1)
decision makers must be able to utilize the best available data and assessment tools on a
given date; (2) the flexible mechanism can be used for the implementation of management
plans: for example, a multi-targeted approach for improving monitoring schemes,
establishing an institutional framework, and evaluating achievements; and (3) the process of
negotiating agreements must be flexible in order to gain most parties' interests and
cooperation. Both approaches are highly recommended for transboundary groundwater
management.
5.1.2 Precautionary Principle for Transboundary Groundwater Management
As mentioned, there are not many treaties covering transboundary groundwater
resources, compared with surface water. Most treaties mentioning groundwater are
secondary issues to the primary issue of surface water provisions. To address the absence of
agreements, the 1977 United Nations Water Conference recommends, "In the absence of
bilateral or multilateral agreements, Member States continue to apply generally accepted32
principles of international law in the use, development and management of shared water
resources" (Report of the United Nations Water Conference, Mar del Plata 1977). This
statement suggests that the general principles are valid for the management of transboundary
groundwater as well, and they can also lead to the development of specific regulations.
Scholars (Baberis 1991, Freestone 1999, Krishira and Salman 1991) have proposed
general principles in relation to freshwater resources that have been widely used in
environmental law: the precautionary principle; the obligation not to cause appreciable
harm; equitable and reasonable use; prior notice obligation and the duly to negotiate;
polluter pays; and sustainable development. In particular, the importance of equitable and
reasonable use has often been argued in the area of water allocation concerns, since equity in
water-sharing is a key issue of water conflict resolutions (Solanesl992, Wolf 1999a).
However, other than equitable and reasonable use, there are not many principles found in the
agreements comprising the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD). The
principles that apply to provisions governing quality, such as the obligation not to cause
appreciable harm and polluter pays, are found far less than the equitable and reasonable use
principle in the TFDD. This reflects Giordano' s analysis of quality provisions in agreements
concerning surface water management in TFDD: "Treaties with water quality provisions
remain a significant minority" (Giordano 2001). The application of principles likely depends
upon the problems with which a particular agreement is primarily concerned.
Among these principles, the precautionaryprinciple23should play a main role in
enhancing the regulation of both quality and quantity of groundwater because the principle
embraces the characteristics of how a decision maker deals with the uncertainty of the
sciences. The principle from a policy perspective "... can be characterized as addressing the
manner in which policy maker, for purposes of protecting the environment, apply science,
technology and economics" (Freestone and Hey 1996, p. 12). The precautionary principle is
23There is still a debate about whether or not the precautionary principle is a principle of customary
international law. This discussion is found in "The Status of the Precautionary Principle in
International Law," by James Cameron and Juli Abouchar, 1996.33
a code that policy makers are obliged to apply to the comprehensive approaches to protect
the environment.
The precautionary principle originated in German environmentalpolicy.24It was
described by the German Federal Government in 1976 under the name of the
Vorsorgeprinzip
25(Cameron and Abouchar 1996,p. 31). Vorsorgeprinzip emerged on the
international level, such as in the Declaration of the Second International North Sea
Conference on the Protection of the North Sea (London Declaration). There are a number of
different ways to define or describe the precautionary principle (Kiss l996,p.2'7). The Rio
Declaration is the most prominent recognition of the principle (Freestone and Hey 1996,p.
5). Principle 15 states:
"In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation". (Rio de
26 Janeiro, June 14, 1992)
As Principle 15 explains, the precautionary principle states that uncertainty is not a reason
for not protecting natural resources. The precautionary principle means moving forward
with decisions despite uncertainty. In the case of transboundary groundwater, the resource in
many places has been degraded because uncertainty over physical properties caused delays
in regulatory action. The application of the precautionary principle would positively affect
action by regulation by reducing delays caused by uncertainty.
24Further descriptions are found in "Origins and Development of the Precautionary Principle," by
David Freestone and Ellen Hey, 1996.
25Vorsorgeprinzip is "Environmental policy is not fully accomplished by warding off imminent
hazards and the elimination of damage which has occurred. Precautionary environmental policy
requires furthermore that natural resources are protected and demands on them made with care."
26Rio de Janeiro, June141992 311LM874.34
The precautionary principle has "become intrinsic to international environmental
policy" (Freestone and Hey 1996, p. 3). In fact, the principle has already been invoked with
respect to marine pollution, hazardous wastes, climate change, ozone depletion, biodiversity,
fisheries management, and general environmental management (Gullett 1997,p. 55). Yet the
application of the precautionary principle to situations involving transboundary groundwater
resources is found in only two agreements (2 multilateral) in the TFDD; two agreements
include an actual precautionary principle.
The previous examples suggest that policy makers should begin to apply the
precautionary principle to prevent further degradation of transboundary groundwater;
however, the concept of precaution itself has already been considered in the management of
transboundary groundwater resources. Nolkaemper mentioned that "[most environmental
treaties] include a principle embodying the objective of precaution" (Nollkaemper 1996,p.
79). The idea of precaution and the precautionary principle differ in that the precautionary
principle is, according to Cameron and Aboutchar, a "guiding principle" (Cameron and
Aboutchar 1996, p. 30). As a guiding principle, the precautionary principle can lead to more
inclusive actions against environmental degradation. For example, the Bellagio Draft treaty
(1966) includes the idea of precaution in regard to the degradation of both quantity and
quality, although it does not precisely mentions the precautionary principle as a concept. The
Bellagio Draft Treaty mentions the significance of the hydrologic cycle in a comprehensive
approach to groundwater management that involves protecting both surface and
underground water. To protect the hydrologic cycle, the Draft also extends protection to the
surface area: "Transboundary Groundwater Conservation Areas" (Article 7) is delineated in
order to conserve the quality and quantity of groundwater management concerns. This
delineation is based on the idea of precaution. The term conservation remains a question of
uncertainty, such as how influential is the conservation area of a transboundary groundwater
resource and how much area must be conserved. Even though there is no specific evidence
for the extent to which land use impacts the quantity of groundwater, the idea of precaution
leads to protecting against possible degradation. The precautionary principle melds the idea35
of precaution with comprehensive and specific approaches by science, technology, and
economics.
In addition, I recommend the inclusion of the precautionary principle asa way of
addressing future issues in the management and protection of groundwater. Thereason can
be explained by differences between prevention and precaution. According to Kiss, the
difference is "in the evaluation of the risk threatening the environment" (Kiss 1996,p. 27).
Kiss states that precaution will apply "when risk is high", while prevention implies that
environmental degradation has occurred and that preventive action will be taken against
further degradation. Because transboundary groundwater management is still in its infancy,
there is a strong possibility that sooner or later water resources will face serious degradation.
By taking into account the possibility of degradation under current situations, the concept of
precaution has been integrated with various factors, the precautionary principle as a guiding
principle provides the opportunity for acting positively with regard to future generations.
The precautionary principle must be implemented with some conditions in order to
apply it to transboundary groundwater management. First, the definition should include the
kinds of activities that may impact a specific object. Although uncertaintymay exist
regarding potential impacts and in forecasting damages, policy makers should nevertheless
mention them clearly in the definition. Second, the precautionary principle should treat the
object inclusively. The precautionary principle in the context of water agreements has not
been considered in relation to the quantity of groundwater. The influences of hazardous
substances, water-related disease andlor transboundary impacts on the environment are
discussed in the other water-related agreements, such as the Convention on the Protection
and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lake (1992) and The Protocol on
Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and International Lakes (1999). These agreements only deal with water quality
concerns, and still do not specifically address quantity provisions.
In summary, the precautionary principle is a notable principle for transboundary
groundwater management for the following reasons: (1) The regulation of transboundary36
groundwater resources has not yet been fully developed. Thus, regulation of both quality and
quantity should have a risk-hedge element, which prevents the further degradation of
groundwater. (2) The precautionary principle can be applied not only to quality provisions,
but also to quantity provisions, which are influenced by negative conditions in land-surface
activities. (3) The precautionary principle can enhance timely actions to prevent the
degradation of transboundary groundwater. (4) For future generations, the precautionary
principle supports sustainable development of natural resources. The precautionary
principle will serve not only for the provision of uncertainty, but also for enhancing research
on transboundary groundwater in order to bring more attention to this resource.
6. Future Implementations
The direction in which transboundaiy groundwater management should proceed is
not easy to answer. It is difficult to delineate the optimal geographical unit for management
of a resource, and, even if the unit can be determined, there is no guarantee of obtaining
consensus from involved States. Furthermore, decision makers must respond to pressing
population issues and a changing environment more quickly than in the past. Hence, it is all
the more important for decision makers to act in a rational, multi-perspective manner
regarding transboundary groundwater management.
As noted above, a framework for transboundary groundwater management has not
yet been created. A concrete and explicit management framework is necessary for the
sustainable management of this water resource. Such a management framework must be a
balance of regime, organization, and institution. Each has a unique function within the
framework, but all are dynamic, which maximizes their ability to evolve if necessary.
Consequently, each has the potential to interact with the others to serve the common
interestbetter management of groundwater.
A regime would provide a structure for environmental protection drawn from various
aspects, such as politics, economics, and socioeconomics. Furthermore, in the absence of37
definite transboundary groundwater regulations, the regime can demonstrate awareness of
the urgency of groundwater management. A regime is defined as, "sets of implicitor explicit
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectation
converge in a given area of international relations" (Krasner 1983, p 2). Yong (1989) gives
another definition of regimes, as "social institutions governing the actions of those involved
in specifiable activities or set of activities." The regimes act as voluntary constraints, using
sets of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, but with no obligation to
follow them.
Additionally, regimes do not stay permanently in the same form; they are
continuously evolving in response to economic, socioeconomic, and political factors. In
transboundary groundwater management, particularly,principles27function as guidelines.
As noted in the previous section, principles, such as the precautionary principle, the
obligation not to cause appreciable harm, equitable and reasonable use, prior notice
obligation and the duty to negotiate, polluter pays, and sustainable development, are all
regimes that have been used in international environmental law related to water resource
management. These principles continuously serve the development of water resource
management. With respect to transboundary groundwater, these regimes are necessary for
groundwater management to grow out of its infancy and show definite progress.
Contrary to the clear definition of regime, organizations and institutions are used
interchangeably in literatureY To use Mantzavinos' words, an organization consists of
"corporate actors' groups of individuals bound by some rules designed to achieve a common
objective (or to solve a common problem)" (Mantzavinos 2001,p. 83). North explains this
concept more specifically. He defines organizations as "players of the game", while an
institution is "the rules of the game in a society" (North 1990,p. 3). These rules differ
27According to Krasner, the principles are "belief of fact, causation, and rectitude" (Krasner 1983).
28There are various definitions of both institutions and organizations. These discussions are found
in, for example, Yong, Oran (1989). International Cooperation, North, D (1990). Institutions,
Institutional Change and Economic Performance.38
somewhat from the rules used in regimes, since these rules work for only a particular
situation. In contrast, rules for regimes are overarching, comprising individual sets of rules
for various issues. Another definition of institution, according to Aoki, is" [an] equilibrium
phenomena"; however, this does not mean, "institutions are rigidly frozen" (Aoki 2001,p. 2).
In addition, the institutional role primarily is "to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable
(but not necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction" (North 1990,p. 6). In this
sense, organizations are freestanding clusters of groups in a broadarea29to pursue a
common objective. Institutions are purposefully created at some point, and they are
established in a specific area. In this study, the term institutions applies to agreement
between States. Institutions directly act on a specific situation and reduce
uncertaintyuncertain. Thus, utilizing institutions for transboundary groundwater
management is tremendously influential, since groundwater issues are likely to be localized.
On the other hand, the term organizations applies to entities such as the United Nations,
World Bank groups, regional investment banks, and NGOs (depending on the specificity of
the NGO). As a facilitator, financial supporter, and technical advisor, an organization can
enhance cooperation to attain sustainable transboundary groundwater management.
The institutional approach for transboundary surface water resource management
has been established within a certain geographical setting in order to pursue equity,
efficiency, and sustainability of water resources. A joint management structure is often part
of an institutional arrangement. The joint management scheme often consists of a
multi-faceted approach, focusing not only on the methods of the water resource management
scheme, but also on the improvement of human resources by addressing issues such as
human rights, health, education, and environment in the region. Establishing a similar
management scheme might be beneficial for transboundary groundwater management, since
we cannot separate social, environmental, political, socioeconomic, and economic issues
from water management. In particular, cost sharing of monitoring is essential. In order to
29The term area can apply to both a geographical and an interdisciplinary field.39
bridge the gap between surface and groundwater management, Feitelson and Haddad
suggest, "One applicable lesson that can be gleaned from the extensive experiences
regarding management of international surface water is that successful cross-boundary
institutions30evolve over time, as experience and confidence builds up" (Feitelson and
Haddad 1997). The institutional management scheme for transboundary surface water is
likely to be effective, although there are some constraints for the institutional mechanism.
One of the institutional approaches that has been discussed for transboundary surface
water management is "integrated water resource management" This basin-wide approach
has been studied for transboundary surface water resource management (Chenoweth et al.
2001, Kliot et al. 2001). However, according to Tortajada, "there is no clear consensus
among the water experts as to what issues are to be integrated" (Tortajada 2001, p.229).
Integrated water resource management stipulates, "in managing the resource, both the
physical and non-physical aspects are considered simultaneously, while taking a long-term
perspective" (Savenije 2000). Integrated water resource management is a complex
institutional form. Thus, many scholars have debated the specific conditions for applying the
integrated water resources approach to surface water (Chenoweth et al. 2001, Kliot et al.
2001, Nakayama 1997, Tortajada 2001, Van der Zaag et al. 2000). Basically, this approach
must facilitate consensus among all riparian countries and requires institutional stability to
manage multiple issues. An institutional arrangement is rarely out of accord with the
involved basin States; however riparian States that have been left out of existing agreements
are naturally less receptive to integrated water management initiatives. This is the largest
obstacle to this approach. For example, in the study of treaties related to surface water
quality, Giordano (2002) found that "the absence of all-inclusive basin memberships is
prominent for surface water" (Giordano 2002). For example, the Mekong Committee (MC)
is one of the prominent transboundary joint management schemes, as a result of the
agreement between the governments of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam in 1975.
30It is assumed that thisinstitution isused in the as same sense as organization, since the authors did
not define this term.40
This agreement was an initiative by the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and
Far East (ECAFE) (Nakayama 1997); however, the committee has been struggling to obtain
all riparian countries' commitment. The specific conditions of integrated water resource
management depend on political, economic, and socioeconomic factors, which are different
in each basin. Therefore, it would be equally difficult to apply this approach to
transboundary groundwater.
In considering the difficulties of integrated water resource management, what kinds
of criteria and considerations should decision makers include for transboundary
groundwater management? First, transboundary groundwater management has to be
specific to each aquifer, with respect to local institutions, since each aquifer has unique
physical characteristics, socioeconomic considerations, and political conditions. An
institution must originate from a particular situation. In addition, transboundary
groundwater management requires not only cooperation among involved States, but also
extends to the three-dimensional management of surface- and groundwater interactions, as
discussed in Section 2. If these hydrological relationships are present, then transboundary
groundwater management must be coordinated with surface water management. Second,
institutions must evolve over time, and they must have a flexible mechanism in order to
accommodate the uncertainty of groundwater physical characteristics. Feitelson and
Haddad state, "institutional flexibility and adaptability may be a requisite for the
sustainability of management structure" (Feitelson and Haddad 1998). Third, institutional
arrangements have to operate from both centralized and decentralized perspectives, but not
from a hierarchical approach. In other words, these arrangements must avoid detachment
from other institutions related to water resource. Institutional frameworks have to be well
networked. Last, in order to assist institutions' stability, organizations must take the
initiative to provide technical, financial, and advisory support in the development of
institutions.
Taking into the consideration the above criteria, I recommended what I term the
"Interactive Coordinated Approach (ICA)" for transboundary aquifer management if the41
involved States cannot otherwise reach accord on a particular agreement. The idea ofa
coordinated approach for surface water management would surmount the issues of
sovereignty contained within the integrated approach (Medzini and Wolf 2001,p. 113). The
coordinated approach takes into account quality, quantity, and timing for water allocation at
the point of intersection of boundaries. The rationale of the coordinated approach, first, is
that each State can continue to pursue its own institutions of water resource management. In
other words, a State is responsible for the efficiency of water usage within its own borders A
riparian country would not need to intervene in other countries' management because this
approach, by agreement, guarantees appropriate levels of quality, quantity, and timing for
water allocation. Although setting these fundamental levels maybe be difficult for
groundwater, the involved States would be commited to working within the framework. This
approach is advantageous under circumstances where there is already a history of political
interactions among the involved States. The largest obstacles to realizing this approach are
how to reduce differences in water system infrastructures within each State and how to
establish credibility among involved States.
Therefore, to some extent, the joint and coordinated management approaches must
be juxtaposed. Since joint management means that activities are jointly organized within the
involved States, the development of a joint management scheme should involve the sharing
of technical and economic costs; however, joint management does not deal with political
negotiations. Working with physical data monitoring and data analyses can help to reduce
some of the difficulties involved in creating trusting political relationships.
The fundamental transparency of physical data is important when used in the scheme
of the coordinated approach. Secondly, this approach gives an incentive for a State to
negotiate to achieve its own interests. Additionally, States have an incentive to negotiate
with others if climate changes or increasing demand for water forces a change in the terms of
the institutions. Finally, the institutional approach can evolve over time, based on the
cooperating States' relationships.42
When applied to transboundary groundwater, the coordinated approach would
primarily consider the physical characteristics of groundwater. Therefore, the term
interactivemodifies the concept of the coordinated approach. The concept of interaction
relates to three aspects regarding the previous criteria for transboundary groundwater
institutions. First, interaction refers to the hydrological cycle between surface and
groundwater. Second, it applies to the level of coordination of institutional management
frameworks, from local users to regional, national, and transnational levels. In order to
reduce monitoring costs and physical data analysis, a joint management scheme is required.
Since a given aquifer is indigenous to the local user, the framework has to be present at the
local level. Compared with surface water, groundwater flows slowly through the
belowground geologic structure; consequently, once groundwater is contaminated by
chemical substances, the problem is likely to be localized. Therefore, management at the
local level is necessary. After some time, the problem potentially expands to the geographic
regional level. The inclusion of the regional level takes into account various aspects of water
resources. At this level of management, the considerations should include the agricultural or
development sectors for economical and sustainable water usage, waste/sewage water
sectors, surface water management sectors, and public participation. At the national level,
delegates should be sent from each region. The transnational level functions for political
negotiation with other States.
Finally, interactions with external organizationsinternational organizations, such
as such as the United Nations, World Bank group, the regional investment banks, and
NGOsare essential in the beginning for financial support and mediation between States.
The interactions with external organizations may encourage the more rapid embodiment of
an institutional approach. Furthermore, when conflicts or crises occur in relation to
groundwater, these interactions can surely assist States to act positively.
The concept of the Interactive Coordinated Approach is still an abstraction, and the
application of this approach may depend on the level of infrastructure capacity between
States. If there is a huge discrepancy between infrastructure levels in an institutional43
arrangement for water resource management between States, the initial approach may be to
establish a joint management scheme for the purpose of physical data collections, either
informally or formally, rather than the coordinated approach. The purpose for creating an
Interactive Coordinated Approach is to enhance the understanding of fundamental principles
of transboundary aquifer management. To establish this approach and to see its effects will
take a long time; however, a long-term perspective for transboundary groundwater
management is a necessity.
Institutional approaches with organizational assistance can mitigate tensions over
water stress and reduce uncertainty in a society, since the framework of institutions and
organizations evolves interactively (North 1990, p. 5). The disposition of institutional
approaches conforms to society. Despite their rigidity, institutions have to adapt and be
flexible to the current situations, since the issues surrounding water resources are varied and
complex. Up until the present, States have been likely to cooperate over water (Wolf 1998);
for the future, however, researchers Wolf, Yoffe, and Giordano (forthcoming) have proposed
a question: "Why might the future look nothing like the past?" Since water sources have
begun to shift from surface- to groundwater, the stability of water quality and quantity is in
danger. Furthermore, the global environment is changing very quickly. Decision makers and
scientists should respond swiftly and effectively since the world population is growing, and
food production depends upon water availability. Population growth places additional stress
on the environment and adds to soil degradation, contamination and scarcity of water, air
pollution, and extreme natural disasters. Consequently, many people become environmental
refugees, living their everyday lives under pressure.
Since the Cold War, scholars have been aware of a link between national security and
environmental degradation. Mathews suggested the necessity of redefining national security
in 1989. In her words, there is "the need for another analogous, broadening definition of
national security to include resource, environmental and demographic issues" (Mathews
1989). Environmental security is a contentious idea, however, because the fundamental
definition of the security concept itself has often been debated (Dalby 1992, Deudney 1991,44
Lowi 1999, Uliman 1983). Many researchers make different assumptions about what
security means and how it can be linked to the environment. Based on the various
assumptions about the term security, a country's security issues should not be linked to
environmental problems.
Even though in the past water scarcity and degradation have not been linked with
national security issues, in the future, they may be connected. Wolf et al. (forthcoming)
states, "The combination of changes, in water resources and in conflict, suggest that
tomorrow' s disputes may look very different from today's." Although we cannot predict
what will happen with water issues, we can definitely see that the problems of groundwater
are becoming even more serious issues. The urgency of these problems is evident in the parts
of the world that heavily depend on groundwater for their water supply. In particular, the
most serious concern is the usage of fossil groundwater. Once the water is gone, it will not
replenish itself. The increasing human population also spurs heavier groundwater usage.
However, we also seem to have an increasing awareness of the importance of groundwater
resource managementhow to maintain and improve the quantity and quality of
groundwater.
7. Conclusion
This inquiry has found that three components of international groundwater
managementenvironmental law, past trends in groundwater management, and institutional
frameworkare changing in order to meet demands and to address issues of transboundary
groundwater resource over time.
International law promotes the recognition of groundwater status at the global scale.
Examining the past treaties concludes that groundwater management must be specific in
order to be effective, since the hydrological relationships between surface and groundwater
have to be taken into account for management. Thus, past practices for surface and
groundwater managements have been often conjunctively operated. In order to address45
uncertainties of physical characteristics of groundwater and transboundary elements, an
institutional arrangement based on each aquifer basins or a basin-wide approach with
surface water is adequate for transboundary groundwater management. In addition, the
various level of institutional arrangements are required.
Water issues are a focal point in order to maintain environmental and human health.
In consideration of the significant amount of groundwater in the world, groundwater
resource management has become more critical for human and environmental communities.
Nevertheless, this study shows that 62 of the more than 400 transboundary freshwater
treaties reviewed mentioned groundwater. Of these, the majority used ambiguous language
and did not mention specific frameworks for groundwater resource management, such as
allocations, management principles, and surface and groundwater interactions. Only nine
treaties addressed a specific groundwater resource provision. Despite the urgency of
groundwater management concerns, the international law arena has not yet fully recognized
the need. This analysis of treaties reveals the lack of concrete institutional arrangements for
transboundary groundwater resource management.
Surface water regulation, as is, should not be adopted for groundwater resource
management because, as yet, we do not know enough about groundwater. Increased
knowledge of the physical interactions between the land surface area and below ground is
especially desireable, since quality and quantity of groundwater are highly influenced by
land use development on the surface. In order to mitigate uncertainty originating from
groundwater's physical characteristics, the precautionary principle may be used as a tool for
building awareness and enhancing actions for transboundary groundwater management.
In addition, better-defined transboundary groundwater regulations are needed. The
Interactive Coordinated Approach might be one suggestion for transboundary groundwater
management. The effectiveness of the institutional approach for transboundary groundwater
should also be recognized. In particular, institutional arrangements with organizational
assistance should be substantial in this beginning stage of transboundary groundwater
management. The conditions for institutional approaches must take into account46
consideration of political, economic, socioeconomic, and environmental factors for each
aquifer. The customized institutional approach consists of all levels, from local users to
transnational entities.
Transboundary groundwater management urgently requires guidelines to enhance
awareness of this finite resource. Unfortunately, most transboundary aquifers fall into a
transitional stage; only a few transboundary aquifers have been studied intensively, such as
the Mountain Aquifer between Palestine and Israel, and the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer,
GuaranI Aquifer, and others being examined by UNESCO (United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization), IAH (International Hydrological Programme), FAO
(Food and Agriculture Organization of the United States), and UNECE (United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe). Although these studies are still in progress, they will
help to establish institutional stability. Finally, the subject of transboundary aquifer
management should be widely discussed. This discussion should lead to the establishment of
concrete frameworks and long-term commitments for the protection of groundwater, not
only in order to address the degradation of this resource, but also to plan for the high demand
for water in the future.47
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AppendicesAppendix 1 (A) : Level 3
Treaty name Category2 Date #of Parties Countries GW Reference
Treaty of peace between the state of Israel and Quantity 10/26/1994Bilateral Israel, Jordan Article IV
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, done at (quality)
Arava/Araba crossing point
Johnston Negotiations Quality 12/31/1955Multilateral Israel, Jordan, Syria, 3. Division of Water
Lebanon
Convention regarding the Water Supply of AdenQuantity 4/11/1910 BilateralGreat Britain, Aden (Yemen)Entire agreement
between Great Britain and the Sultan of Abdali
Treaty concerning the state frontier and Quantity 6/13/1975 Bilateral Iran, Iraq Article 4
neighbourly relations between Iran and Iraq and
protocol
Convention on cooperation for the protection Quality 6/29/1994MultilateralAustria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Article 2 (1)
and sustainable use of the River Danube Germany, Hungary, Republic
of Moldova, Romania,
Slovakia, Ukraine, European
Economic Community
Mexico-US agreement on the permanent and Quantity 8/30/1973 Bilateral Mexico, United States Article 5
definitive solution to the salinity of the Colorado
River Basin (International Boundary and Water
Commission Minute No. 242)The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip: Protocol Concerning
Civil Affairs
Quantity 9/28/1995 BilateralIsrael, Palestine AutonomyAnnex III Article
40. Schedule 8,10
Convention on environmental impact assessment in a Quantity 9/10/1997MultilateralAlbania, Austria, Byelarus, Appendix I
transboundary context, Espoo Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada,
Croatia, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Moldova
(Republic of), Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russian
Federation, Slovakia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland,
Ukraine, United Kingdom,
United States
Convention on the protection, utilization and Quantity 9/6/1977 Bilateral Swiss, France Chapter 1-Article 1,
recharging of the Geneva Aquifer between Canton ol (quality) Ch 4, Article 9
Geneva in Switzerland and the department of
Haute-Savoie in France
UiAppendix 1 (B) : Level 2
Treaty name Category2 Date #of Parties Countries GW Reference
Agreement between Persia and Turkey Territory! 1/23/1932 Bilateral Persia, Turkey Exchange of
concerning the fixing of the frontier line boundary Notes
Joint declaration of principles for utilization of Quantity 1/31/2975MultilateralCambodia, Laos, Thailand,Article XXIII
the waters of the lower Mekong basin, signed by Vietnam
the representatives of the Governments of
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam to the
committee for coordination of investigations of
the lower Mekong basin
Statute of the Committee for Co-Ordination of Quantity 10/31/1957MultilateralKampuchea, Laos, Thailand,Article XXIII
Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin Vietnam
Established by the Governments of Cambodia,
Laos, Thailand, and the Republic of Viet-Nam in
Response to the Decision Taken by the United
Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the
Far East
Draft agreement on water quality management Physical 11/12/1997MultilateralByelarus, Latvia, Russian Introduction
of Zapadnaya Dvina/Daugava River basin relationships Federation
Treaty Between the United States of America Others 11/14/1944 Bilateral United States, Mexico Article 4
and Mexico Relating to the Waters of the
Colorado and Tijuana Rivers, and of the Rio
Grande
00Protocol Amending the 1978 Agreement Physical 11/18/1987 Bilateral Canada, United States Annex 16
Between the United States of American and relationships
Canada on Great Lakes Water Quality, as
Amended onl6.10.1983
Convention creating the Niger Basin Authority Others 11/21/1980Multilateral Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Article 4 (d)
&Protocol Côte D'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali,
Niger, Nigeria, Upper Volta
Agreement between The Federal Republic of Quality 12/1/1987MultilateralGermany (GFR), Austria, Article2
Germany and the EEC, on the one hand, and,the EEC
Republic of Austria, on the other, on cooperation
and management of water resources in the
Danube Basin
Provisions relating to the Belgian-German Physical 11/6/1922 Bilateral Belgium, German Subsection 1 and
frontier established by a six-nation delimitationrelationships 3
commission in execution of the Versailles Treaty
Arrangement between Germany and BelgiumTerritory/bound11/7/1929 Bilateral Belgium, German Article 65
concerning the common frontier ary
Agreement Between Finland and Sweden Physical 12/15/1971 Bilateral Finland, Sweden Article 2
Concerning Frontier Waters relationships
Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Physical 12/3/1976Multilateral Germany (GFR), France, Article 7-2
against chemical pollution relationships Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Switzerland, European
Economic Community
France-Federal Republic of Physical 12/3/1976Multilateral Germany, Luxembourg, Article 7
Germany-Luxembourg-Netherlands-Switzerlanrelationships Netherlands, Switzerland
d: Convention on the protection of the Rhine
against pollution by Chlorides
'.0Treaty of Peace with Italy, Signed at Paris, on 10Territory! 2/10/1947MultilateralItaly, France (primarily), and Annex 5
February 1947 boundary the Allied Powers
Agreement between the governments of Great Territory! 2/2/1888 Bilateral UK, France Article 1
Britain and France with regard to the Somali boundary
Coast
Exchanges of notes between the United Territory! 3/18/1904 Bilateral UK, France Aticle III
Kingdom and France constituting an agreementboundary
relating to the Boundary between the Gold Coast
and the French Sudan
Agreement on joint activities in addressing the Quality 3/26/1993Multilateral Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Article 1
Aral Sea and the zone around the Sea crisis, Taj ikistan, Turkmenistan,
improving the environment, and enduring the Uzbekistan
social and economic development of the Aral
Searegion
Convention between Switzerland and Italy Quality 4/20/1972 Bilateral Switzerland, Italy Article 1
concerning the protection of Italo-Swiss Waters
against pollution
State Treaty between the Grand Duchy of Physical 4/25/1950 Bilateral Luxembourg, Germany Article 6,10
Luxembourg and the land Rhineland-Palatinaterelationships (GFR)
in the Federal Republic of Geramny concerning
the construction of a hydro-electric power-plant
on Sauer at RosportlRalingen
Agreement concerning water-economy Others 4/4/1958 Bilateral Yugoslavia, Bulgaria Article 1
questions between the government of the Federal
People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the
Government of the People's Republic ofConvention and Statutes relating to the Others 5/22/1964Multilateral Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Article 4
development of the Chad Basin Nigeria
Agreement between the Republic of Syria and Water right 6/4/1953 Bilateral Jordan, Syria Article 8
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan concerning
the utilization of the Yarmuk waters.
State treaty between the Grand Duchy of Physical 7/10/1958 Bilateral Luxembourg, Annex II
Luxembourg and the Land Rhineland-Palatinaterelationships Germany(FRG)
in the Federal Republic of Germany concerning
the construction of hydroelectric
power-installations on the Our(with annexes)
Agreement between the Government of the Territory! 7/17/1964 Bilateral USSR, Poland Article 2(3)
Polish People's Republic and the Government olboundary
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
concerning the use of water resources in frontier
waters
Exchange of notes between France and GreatTerritory/bound7/19/1906 Bilateral Great Britain, France Article 41(3)
Britain relative to the boundary between the ary
Gold Coast and French Sudan
Process-Verbal from the meeting of Yugoslav Physical 9/1/1957 Bilateral Yugoslav, Greek Section A ii(d),
and Greek delegations at Stan Dojran, to relationships Section B (d)
determine the manner and plan of collaboration
concerning hydroeconomic studies of the
drainage basin of Lake DojranAgreement between the Government of the Others 8/8/1955 Bilateral Hungary, Yugoslavia Article 1
Fededal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the
Government of the Hungarian People's Republic
Together with the Statute of the
Yugoslav-Hungarian Water Economy
Commission
African Convention on the conservation of Others 9/15/1968MultilateralAlgeria, Cameroon, CentralArticle V water
nature and natural resources African Republic, Congo,
Cote D'Ivoire, Djibouti,
Egypt, Ghana, Kenya
Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Morocco,
Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Senegal,
Seychelles, Sudan,
Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia,
Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire
Franco-Italian convention concerning the supplyPhysical 9/28/1967 Bilateral France, Italy Article I
of water to the Commune of Menton relationships
Convention between the French Republic and Physical 7/4/1969 Bilateral France, Germany Article 2
the Federal Republic of Germany concerning relationships
development of the Rhine between
Strasbourg/Kehl and Lauterbourg/Neuburgweier
Exchange of Notes between the United KingdomPhysical 6/15/1925 Bilateral United Kingdom, Italy Question 4.5
and Italy respecting the regulation of the relationships
utilisation of the waters of the river GashUN/ECE protocol on water and health to the Others 6/17/1999MultilateralAlbania, Armenia, Belgium, Article
1992 convention on the protection and use of Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 2,3,5,6-5(b)
transboundary watercourses and international Czech Republic, Denmark,
lakes Estonia, Finland, France,
Georgia, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta,
Monaco, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Republic of Moldova,
Romania, Russian
Federation, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Ukraine, United
Kingdom
Statute of the River Uruguay Physical 2/26/1975 Bilateral Argentina, Uruguay Chapter IX
relationshipsAppendix 1 (C) : Level 1
Treaty name Category2 Date #of Parties Countries GW Reference
Treaty between Germany and Poland for the Territory! 1/27/1926 Bilateral Germany, Poland 9.23.6.1922
Settlement of Frontier Questions boundary
Agreement between the USSR and Territory! 1/18/1958 Bilateral USSR, Afghanistan Article 1
Afghanistan boundary
Agreement between France and Great Britain Water right 10/19/1906 Bilateral Great Britain, France Annex III
relative to the Frontier between French and
British possessions from the Gulf of Guinea to
theNiger
Convention between the French Republic and Physical 10/27/1956 Bilateral France, Germany Article 4
the Federal Republic of Germany on the relationships
development of the upper course of the Rhine
between Basel and Strasbourg
Convention between the government of the Physical 11/16/1962 Bilateral France, Switzerland Article 1
French Republic and the Swiss Federal relationships
Council Concerning protection of the waters of
Lake Geneva against pollution
Areement between the USSR and Territory! 11/30/1956 Bilateral USSR, Czechoslovakia Article 1,
Czechoslobakia boundary Paragraph 2
Austria-Czechoslovakia treaty regarding the Territory! 12/13/1928 Bilateral Austria, Czechoslovakia Article 4
settlement of frontier legal questions boundaryAgreement between the Government of the Others 12/5/1 956 Bilateral Albania, Yugoslavia Article!
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and
the Government of the People's Republic of
Albania concerning water economy questions,
together with the statue of the
Yugoslav-Albanian Water economic
commission and with the protocol concerning
fishing in frontier lakes and rivers
Agreement between Egypt and Italy Territory/ 12/6/1925 Bilateral Egypt, Italy Article 5, 6
concerning the establishment of frontiers boundary
between Cyrenaica and Egypt
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement Physical 12/7/1946 Bilateral Great Britain, Egypt Enclosure
between the United Kingdom of Great Britainrelationships
and Northern Ireland and Egypt regarding the
utilisation of profits from the 1940 British
government cotton buying commission and the
1941 joint Anglo-Egyptian cotton buying
commission to finance schemes for village
water suppliesConvention on the protection and use of Quality 3/18/1992MultilateralAlbania, Austria, Belgium,Article 1,Annex
transboundary watercourses and international Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, III (d)
lakes, Helsinki Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Moldova,
Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United
Kingdom
Agreement between the Government of the Territory! 3/21/1958 Bilateral Czechoslovakia, Poland Article 2
Czechoslovak Republic and the Government boundary
of the Polish People's Republic concerning the
use of water resources in frontier waters
Treaty between France and Switzerland, Others 3/9/1904 Bilateral France, Switzerland Article 6
regulating fishing in Lake Geneva
Treaty between the government of the Union Territory! 5/14/1957 Bilateral USSR, Iran Article 1
of Soviet Socialist Republics and the imperial boundary
government of Iran concerning the Regime of
the Soviet- Iranian Frontier and the procedure
for the settlement of frontier disputes and
Agreement Between The Federal Republic Of Physical 7/17/1986 Bilateral Niger, Nigeria Article 9
Nigeria And The Republic Of Niger relationships
Concerning The Equitable Sharing In The
Development, Conservation And Use Of TheirCommon Water Resources
Agreement between Poland and the German Territory! 7/6/1950 BilateralPoland, German Democratic Article 2
Democratic Republic boundary Republic
Protocol on Shared Watercourse systems in the Others 8/28/1995MultilateralAngola, Botswana, Lesotho, Article 1
Southern African Development community Malawi, Mozambique,
(SADC) region Namibia, South Africa,
Swaziland, Tanzania,
Zambia, Zimbabwe
Revised Protocol on Shared Water Courses in Others 8/7/2000MultilateralAngola, Botswana, Republic Article 1
the Southern African Development of the Congo, Lesotho,
Community Malawi, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia,
Seychelles, South Africa,
Swaziland, Tanzania,
Zambia,_Zimbabwe
Treaty of limits between Portugal and Spain Territory! 9/29/1864 Bilateral Spain, Portugal Article XX VIII.
boundary
Agreement of cooperation between the United Others 7/18/1985 Bilateral Mexico, U.S.A Article 1
States of America and the United Mexican
States regarding pollution of the environment
along the inland international boundary by
discharges of Hazardous Substances